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Political Hijacking: What Law Applies in
Peace and War
William Harvey Reeves*
A new breed of hijackers has evolved as a product of internationalpolitical strife of recent years. In attempts to escape an actua
or self-styled oppressive environment, these political hijackers cause
irreparableinjury and serious danger to travelers, and complicate
the operation of many transportation companies. After sketching
the problems involved in providing adequate reparations to the
injured passengers and corporations, and in implementing adequate
punishment of the offenders, Mr. Reeves examines the question of
whether a hijacked ship or plane might be retained by the arrival
coun'try rather than returned to its foreign owner. The author
concludes that such an act is both diplomatically and legally
unwise, and would constitute a provocation little short of an act of
war.

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Hijacking" is a word which has acquired various meanings. It
has referred to the activities of any robber, particularly one whose
unlawful acts were practiced upon goods in transit on land. The word
has also been used to describe the seizure of a ship as an act of
piracy, such as practiced notoriously by lawless persons along the
eastern coast of China as recently as a quarter of a century ago.
These hijackers would board a vessel as peaceful deck passengers at
some convenient port, such as-Singapore, and thereafter would
temporarily seize control of the ship, rob the passengers and, if
possible, unload valuable cargo into waiting junks which took the loot
and the hijackers to Bias Bay, their base on the mainland of China.,
In'contrast, hijacking most recently has been used to describe the
dramatic effort of some person or persons to find a way to leave one
country-without hindrance or obtaining permission-to enter
another country whose laws, political theories, and economic rules are
more agreeable to him or them. In this sense, hijacking is not the act
of a pirate or a robber, but means the forceful seizure of a ship or
* Member of New York Bar.
I. The New York Times recorded an unusual instance of hijacking an airplane for the sole
purpose of robbing passengers. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1968, at 3, col. I.
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airplane, causing it to interrupt its scheduled voyage and, usually, by
leaving its prescribed course, to enter the territory of another country
for purposes other than monetary gain. The most frequent acts of
political hijacking in recent years have been by persons desiring to
return to Cuba and, though with lesser opportunities, by those
desiring to leave Cuba Similar motivation for hijacking, however,
has been found in other parts of the world troubled by ideological,
political, and economic differences within a country or with
neighboring sovereigns.
The modern hijacker, merely desiring transportation from one
country to another, is not concerned that valuable property is thus
transferred from one national jurisdiction to another as an incident of
his use of armed force. This transfer, however, gives rise to a number
of international legal questions in every country where political
hijacking has occurred. In considering such questions of political
hijacking as a unique manifestation of international political
ideological differences, it must be remembered that political hijacking
always involves two countries, and, although the country where the
successful hijacker finally arrives presumably has done nothing to
encourage the hijacking or to condone it after it has occurred, the
destination country is not the nation whose interests have been
wronged and which has the immediate urge to prosecute the hijacker.
.It should also be recognized that hijacking is a crime against
both persons, the passengers and crew whose lives are risked, and
property, the plane, ship or cargo wrongfully used and diverted.'
From the standpoint of the corporate owner of a hijacked vessel, of
the passengers, and of the owner of any cargo on board, a great
wrong has been committed. In characterizing the act, we may safely
say that the transportation company has suffered a costly nuisance. It
has been deprived of its property and forced to expend funds. The
passengers have been subjected to a justifiable fear for their lives, and
have been carried to a foreign country to which they did not wish to
go. The cargo owner, if any, has been subjected to delay. How
reparations for these losses may be obtained is a troublesome issue,
which shall not be discussed at length here. A few lawsuits have been
initiated against the airline companies by passengers aboard hijacked
2. Eleven persons came to the United States from Cuba by hijacking a Cuban ship. See
notes 9 & 10 infra. Others have come by hijacking airplanes. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1969, at 4E.
3. For the practical difficulties of measures to prevent hijacking and the danger to
airplane passengers opposing a hijacker, see Wall Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1968, at I, col. 4;
TiME, Jan. 31, 1969, at 19.
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planes, alleging liability for failure to prevent this dangerous
occurrence, although so far the great losses suffered and dangers
endured have been damnum absque injuria. It might be possible that
the United States government itself should share in these losses for its
inability to offer effective police measures, somewhat on the same
reasoning that under certain circumstances the investment of United
States nationals abroad is insured against confiscation.4
II.

PUNISHMENT OF THE OFFENDERS

High feelings have been engendered in the United States
concerning hijacking, and public sentiment has clamored for some
method to detect, capture, and punish those who commit acts of
hijacking. Since most hijackers could not respond in damages,
assuming they could be sued, it is probably especially important to
establish a punishment sufficient to deter others from attempting a
hijacking. The Constitution of the United States provides:
The Congress shall have Power. . .To define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; . . .and

make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.

The question arises, therefore, as to the nature of the crime committed
by a political hijacker who returns or is returned to the jurisdiction of
the United States, or who has been caught in an unsuccessful attempt,
or by persons who conspire with a hijacker and thereafter are found
within the United States.
"Piracy" is the word most frequently used to describe the acts of
political hijacking, and certainly such hijackings have some
resemblance to acts of piracy. Curiously, however, the United States
has limited its own definition of piracy to "the crime of piracy, as
defined by the law of nations." ' In the United States, this phrase has
long been interpreted to include various elements: robbery,
depredations on ships and persons on the high seas, and lack of
allegiance to any government. Generally, a pirate is considered an
outlaw-,-pirata est hostis humani generis-over whom every country
has jurisdiction to punish for the crime of piracy. The political
hijacker, however, does not seek to profit from the hijacking other
than for transportation to a place of refuge. Thus, he is not a robber,
4. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b) (1964).
5. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8 (the last sentence appears to relate to war powers).
6. "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States shall be imprisoned for
life." 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
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and therefore not a pirate by definition, nor is his act always
committed on the "high seas."
In 1961, Congress created a new federal crime called "aircraft
piracy" and defined it, without reference to the law of nations, as
follows:
(1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit aircraft piracy, as herein
defined, shall be puni-hed(A) by death if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or in the
case of a plea of guilty, or a plea of not guilty where the defendant has
waived a trial by jury, if the court in its discretion shall so order; or
(B) by imprisonment for not less than twenty years, if the death penalty
is not imposed.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term 'aircraft piracy' means any seizure or
exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence and with
wrongful intent, of an aircraft in flight in air commerce.7

Other sections of this law provide that any crime committed on an
aircraft within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States is punishable with the same penalty as defined in the
various sections of the United States Code relating to federal crimes.
Presumably, these other sections would apply whenever a crime was
committed aboard an airplane not involving the actual assumption of
control of the aircraft in flight.
Efforts at punishment of a successful hijacker (who always
arrives in the other country), however, is a complex question thrust
into intricacies of international relations. Except for wholly fortuitous
circumstances, there are only two practical ways in which jurisdiction
over him may be obtained for the purpose of prosecution: (1)
extradition, from the country to which he fled to the country whose
nationals owned the facilities he had diverted,8 and (2) application of
the traditional feature of the law of piracy to political hijackers,
declaring them universal criminals punishable by right and duty in
any country wherein he may be found.
Several searching questions are here raised. Is the United States
willing to hand over to some other country-Cuba is the obvious
example-a refugee who, by hijacking a ship or plane, has sought the
asylum of the United States? We are apt to welcome such a hijacker
who comes our way, while condemning anyone who leaves the United
States in such a manner, particularly for a communist nation. To be
7. Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, § i, 75 Stat. 466, amending 72 Stat. 784
(codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (1964)).
8. Extradition of a person accused of a crime by a country where he is not physically
present is by treaty between two countries.
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workable, international relations must be reciprocal; while we fear to
return a political hijacker to face death before a firing squad or long
imprisonment, we should remember that our own laws provide the
death penalty for one convicted of aircraft piracy. Should the United
States adopt the position that, however welcome a refugee may be,
hijacking a foreign ship or plane is not the way to accomplish an exit
from his own country and entrance into ours? Can a lawful purpose,
under our jurisprudence, be accomplished by unpunished criminal
acts? Can the United States remain obligated to punish a hijacker for
an act not committed against the United States, but against a plane
or ship of the country from which he fled? Can we be assured that all
nations would really carry out any agreement to punish the political
hijacker?
These questions are matters for the Congress, for the State
Department, as the treaty-making agency, and for our courts. We
should re-examine our laws to determine whether our penalties for
political hijacking are effective deterrents which are fair to other
countries of the world. Above all, the cooperation of all nations is
required in order that the costly and dangerous practice of hijacking
for political purposes maybe abated.

III.

A

CASE OF HIJACKING: WHO GETS THE SHIP?

Another troublesome issue is the treatment accorded to the ship
or airplane used by a political hijacker to transport himself to the
country of refuge. The commonplace diplomatic procedure has been
to return the property to the foreign company owning the ship or
plane, whose agent, captain, or pilot unwillingly diverted the vessel
from its ordered course and thus furnished the desired transportation
to the hijacker. Ownership of the ship or plane or its cargo has
usually not been a matter of controversy. The arrival country might
seek, however, to retain jurisdiction over the ship or plane to satisfy
its claims, or claims of its own nationals, against the foreign,
probably unfriendly, sovereign from whose country the ship or 15ane
was hijacked. The wisdom, both diplomatically and under
international law, of such a procedure requires serious evaluation. The
remaining portion of this article is addressed to this issue, using as a
basis for discussion the case of the Bahia de Nipe9
The Bahia de Nipe and its cargo of sugar became the subject of
9.
1961).

Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aflTd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir.
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international claims and protest that drew wide attention and

occasioned judicial and executive action in the United States. The
vessel had been owned by a Cuban-incorporated company and was
confiscated in Cuba by the Government of Cuba under the

nationalization program of the Castro regime. It was loaded with a
cargo of sugar confiscated from the United Fruit Sugar Company, a

United States national, and was sailing under orders from the Cuban
Government to deliver that cargo to a Soviet port. While on the high

seas north of Cuba, the ship was seized by the captain and ten
members of the crew, and brought into Hampton Roads, Virginia,
where the vessel was surrendered to the United States Coast Guard.
The hijackers requested, and received, political asylum.
The sugar company soon obtained a'libel with clause of foreign

attachment, and demanded that a federal court adjudicate the cargo
of sugar to belong to United Fruit Sugar Company. In addition,
libels were issued on behalf of several other claimants who demanded

satisfaction of their various claims against the ship."' After asserting
its right to acquire in rem jurisdiction, over objections of the executive

branch," the court heard argument as to what disposition it should
make of the ship. The attorney for the Republic of Cuba entered the
case, claimed title to the ship and its cargo, and demanded release of
both. The State Department of the United States asked the release of
the ship to Cuba without adjudication of any of the claims adverse to

Cuba against the ship or cargo. A communication to the court
from the State Department said:
[Tihis is to inform you that the release of this vessel2 would avoid further

disturbance to our international relations in the premises.

10. The other libelants were (I) two longshoremen. James Rich and Walter Precho. who
had recovered judgments against Naviera Vacuba. S.A.. and the Republic of Cuba in actions
instituted in the United States l)istrict Court for the Eastern l)istrict of Pennsylvania: (2) The
Mayan Lines. S.A.. seeking a recovery of a judgment rendered against the Republic of Cuba by
a state court in Louisiana: (3) a third libelant asked for a judgment for fuel and necessaries
furnished vessels owned by Naviera Vacuba. S.A.: (4) the master and ten defecting crew
members claimed wages alleged to be due and unpaid. Also appearing. Naviera Vacuba. S.A..
and Republic of Cuba defending against the action claimed as owners of the ship (apparently
not adversely).
II. When the United States marshal attempted to effect service of process on the ship. the
Coast Guard officer in charge, acting under the authority of the executive branch of the United
States. refused to permit him to serve the libel the process through which the court could
exercise dispositive dominion over the ship. the res. The court properly refused to countenance
this effort at enlargement of the executive authority at the expense or diminution or elimination
of its own: "There is no statute expressly authorizing the Executive to effectively destroy the
judicial process for, without the ability to serve the court process, the doors of the court may be
forever closed." Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 718 (E.D. Va. 1961).
12. Id. at 714.

POLITICAL HIJACKING

1969]

1123

This seemed an insufficient reason for the court to decline to continue
its jurisdiction, and the State Department, through the Secretary of
State, supplemented its request by a further statement:
I understand that the Cuban vessel Bahia de Nipe now at Norfolk is owned by
the Government of Cuba and is employed in the carriage for the Government3 of
Cuba of a cargo of sugar which is the property of the Government of Cuba.

The court, finally convinced that it had before it a "suggestion of
immunity" from the State Department, ordered the ship to be
returned to the authority of the Republic of Cuba. This decision was
confirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit," and the ship, with a new captain supplied from Cuba,
resumed its interrupted voyage.
Thus the case ended, with the issue of ownership of the ship and
cargo unsettled. The attorney for the sugar company made the
following comment upon his company's claim to the sugar and the
action of the United States in granting a suggestion of immunity that
permitted removal of the ship and cargo from the jurisdiction of the
court:
My company was involved in one of these cases which received little publicity.
The efforts of a brave captain and eleven members of his crew to return stolen
property to its owners in the United States was defeated by the intervention of
our Department of Justice-even though Castro had not requested the United
States Government to act as his champion in the matter.'-

The district court judge most certainly believed that the cargo
belonged to the sugar company. He stated:
Under our system of laws, the Court would, if permitted to do so, find that the
title to the cargo of sugar remains in The United Fruit Sugar Company. 6

Except for the holding of the district court in Banco National de
Cuba v. Sabbatino,7 there was no authority at that time for the proposition that title transfers by a foreign act of state in its own country would
be considered invalid in the United States, if confiscatory and contrary
to international law. The Supreme Court confirmed the general rule
that the United States had always adhered to the act of state doctrine
13.

Id.

Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1961).
Folsom, The Outlook Jbr the Alliance Jbr Progress-1964, in 8 ABA INTERNATIONAL
AND CONIPARATIVE LAW SECTION No. 2 at 23 (1964) (an address before the Houston World Trade
Association). Ten crew members joined the captain, making eleven in all who defected and seized
the ship. As customary, the Department of Justice presented the communication from the Department of State.
16. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 724 (E.D. Va. 1961).
17. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
14.
15.
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8
when it reversed the district court in Sabbatino.1
Of course, with the
passage of the "Sabbatino" or "Hickenlooper" Amendment,"0 United
States courts may today find confiscatory acts contrary to international
law do not transfer valid title. The purpose of the Amendment is as
follows:

Congress determined that the national interests in the areas of foreign investment
and international trade and commerce require the elimination of the act of state
doctrine except where the President determines otherwise 0

Any Cuban company, such as had originally owned the Bahia de Nipe,
will not be protected by the Hickenlooper Amendment, however, and
as to such a Cuban-owned Cuban company, Cuban laws must still be
2
recognized as valid even if confiscatory. '
On the other hand, the State Department had stated that both
the ship and cargo were the property of Cuba, either as a mere
assertion without proof, or as a recognition of the validity of Cuba's
confiscatory- acts to transfer title. In addition, the Fifth Circuit made
the following statement:
The certification and suggestion of immunity, however, which has been made by
the State Department in this matter affecting our foreign relations, withdraws it
from the sphere of litigation. Especially is this so when the presence of the ship
within the territorialjurisdiction of the court is made possible only by the
22
barratryof the shipniaster.

The Court of Appeals, in thus characterizing the action of the captain
as "barratry," recognized that the captain had acted in bad faith and
had committed a crime against the owner of the ship, and indirectly
recognized that Cuba was the owner and entitled to possession of the
ship.
If "title" was not the basis in the Bahia De Nipe case for the
judicial release requested, even demanded, by the Executive, are any
other reasons to be found why, either on its own motion or at the "suggestion" of the State Department, the court should have released this
ship? If the facts are analyzed from a maritime point of view, the issue
becomes clear. There has been a forceful seizure on the high seas of a
ship and its cargo which can be characterized, using the statement as
18. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
19. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1965-1967) (originally enacted
as Act of Oct. 7, 1964, 78 Stat. 1013).
20. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (district
court opinion in Sabbatino case after the passage of the "Hickenlooper" Amendment).
21. See F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afj'd
mene., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967).
22. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1961) (emphasis added).
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to ownership made by the sugar company's attorney, as a "capture"
or "recapture" of goods stolen from a United States national and
wrongfully in the possession of another. In the alternative, the act
may be characterized as a "reprisal, 2' 3 the bringing into the United
States by force property belonging to Cuba, the actual act of force
being committed, however, by a private person who had no actual
authority from any government to commit the act. Nevertheless, if the
courts had taken advantage of this act on the high seas by continuing
to hold jurisdiction and by determining disposition of this vessel on
the basis of the claims, such judicial act would have been to condone
and thereby ratify the act in hijacking the ship and would have been
tantamount to an authorization by the United States Government for
the captain and some crew members to have so acted. In this
connection, it must be emphasized that the ship and its cargo were in
possession of and under the control of a sovereign government, the
Republic of Cuba, at the time of the captain's "hijacking."
The question is posed: Has the United States ever permitted or
authorized a private person to seize on the high seas property in
possession of a foreign sovereign, either as recapture of stolen goods
or for payment of, or as reprisal for, an obligation owing to United
States nationals? If so, what were the conditions under which such
authority was granted, and what disposition was made of the ship?
The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the
power to authorize just such acts by private persons. These persons,
when so authorized, are not under the control of any military or civil
authority whatsoever, and vessels which they may use for the
purpose of recapture of property belonging to United States citizens,
or capture of foreign ships as a reprisal, are their own, and their
action is entirely on their own responsibility under the authority
granted to them. The Constitution states:
The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water
24

The power to issue and grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal has
never been exercised except in time of a declared war and by a statute
enacted under constitutional authority, specifically granted by
Congress to the Executive Department. Such Letters of Marque and
Reprisal were issued to numerous private persons during the War of
23. Under United States law, Cuba owed to all United States nationals the value of any
property confiscated by the government.
24.

U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8,

11.
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18122 What the holder of a Letter of Marque might do, and still be
free internationally from the accusation and the penalties of piracy if
he should be apprehended by a foreign power, is spelled out with
meticulous care in each Letter of Marque. The operative part of a
typical Letter of Marque reads as follows:
to subdue, seize and take any armed or unarmed British vessel, public or private,
which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or
elsewhere on the high seas, or within the waters of British dominions, and such
captured vessel, with her apparel, guns and appurtenances and the goods or
effects which shall be found on board the same together with all the British
persons and others who shall be found acting on board, to bring within some
port of the United States; and also to retake any vessel, goods and effects of the
people of the United States, which may have been captured by any British armed
vessel, in order that proceedings may be had concerning such capture and
recapture in due form of law, and as to right and justice shall appertain. The
said [John Doe] is further authorized to detain, seize and take all vessels and
effects to whomsoever belonging which shall be liable thereto according to the
2
law of nations, and the iights of the United States as a power at war.

During the War of 1812, the individuals applied for and accepted

Letters of Marque for various reasons. For some it was pure
patriotism-to assist the inconsiderable Navy of the United States at
that time. Others, whose livelihood in overseas commerce had been
curtailed by the various circumstances growing out of the Napoleonic

wars and the United States' efforts-by embargo and non-intercourse
acts-to avoid international embroilment, by accepting Letters of
Marque, could after war had been declared, seek recoupment of their
losses by seizure of British property on the high seas-a sort of rough
and ready self-help method of collecting personal indemnity or

reparations. Holders of Letters of Marque, subject to certain
conditions, were also permitted to keep for themselves the value of

enemy ships which they captured, whether or not they had ever
suffered losses even remotely attributed to the British. Finally, some
who received Letters of Marque were probably mere gentlemen

adventurers who sought a profit by acts which, unless authorized by
the Government of the United States, would have been considered

piracy.
25. Although various states had issued Letters of Marque and Reprisal during the
American Revolution, the issuance of Letters of Marque and Reprisal is forbidden to the states
by article 111, section 10 of the Constitution. Only the Congress can authorize issuance of Letters
of Marque and Reprisal.
26. Letter of Marque and Reprisal from James Madison, President, and James Monroe,
Secretary of State, for use in the War of 1812 (emphasis added). It appears that in more ancient
times and on the continent of Europe and in time of peace, permission had sometimes been
given to a private individual, who claimed he had been damaged by hostile citizens of a
neighboring sovereign, to cross the national boundary, or marque, and attempt to seize back
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Whenever a ship had been captured by a "privateer," it did not
immediately become the property of the captor. As soon as capture
had occurred a grim race began by the captor and the captured ship,
or perhaps by the captured ship alone in charge of a prize crew, to
reach a friendly port. There the captor would submit the captured
ship and the evidence of its capture to a friendly court, which would
27
thereupon "condemn" the ship and change its nationality and title.
Up until the point of such condemnation, the ship, although captured,
remained in point of law a ship of its nationality before capture, and
the title remained the same. In fact, some mariners believed that it
was proper for a captured ship to fly its own colors until it arrived at
the port of condemnation, even if it were in the hands of a prize
crew. ", This custom may not have been so much a courtesy to the
country from which the ship had been captured as it was a protection
against possible recapture.
In every case, however, condemnation of a ship or cargo by a
court of competent jurisdiction over that ship was universally
recognized as an act of state which transferred title to that ship and
cargo. In fact, it was Justice Marshall, at this early age of our
national existence, who began the restrictive definitions of an act of
state which exist in the phrase, "executed act of state," continuing
until this day. He insisted that unless the condemnation of the ship
and cargo was by a fully executed act of state, which could be done
only by a court which had actual jurisdiction of the ship and
dispositive dominion over it, that the title had not been transferred
and the validity of the act need not be recognized. He said:
The great question to be decided is-was this sentence pronounced by a
court of competent jurisdiction?
At the threshold of this interesting inquiry, a difficulty presents itself, which
is of no inconsiderable magnitude. It is this:
Can this court examine the jurisdiction of a foreign ti bunal?2'

The law of prize as developed in this earlier phase of the history
goods alleged to have been taken from him, or to seize an equal amount as reprisal or
indemnity. Such an action may be characterized as authorized self-help by force of arms.
27. The seizure of a ship was authorized by the Letter of Marque carried. The
..condemnation" was the completion of an "act of state." Sequence of an executed act of state
of captured enemy ship: (I) National policy announced by declaration of war; (2) authorized
execution by the "privateer," holder of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal; (3) judicial
confirmation of executive action (a) that seizure was in accordance with national policy and (b)
that execution was proper and related to a ship subject to authorized seizure.
28. Mangrove Prize Money Cases, 188 U.S. 720, 721-22 (1903).
29. Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 268 (1808).
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of the United States is still, but with some modification, the law of
the United States as a sovereign at war, although no Letters of
Marque and Reprisal have been issued by the United States since the
War of 1812. Letters of Marque were issued by the Confederate
States at the beginning of the Civil War and Southern privateers were
moderately successful for a brief period of time. The attitude of other
countries in refusing to open their ports to prize vessels, together with
the blockade of Southern ports, rendered privateering unprofitable,
and as an institution it had ceased to exist long before the end of the
war. The North countered the action of the Southern States in issuing
such Letters by a Presidential Declaration that any Southern privateer
"will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy." 3 Some Southern privateers apparently
were, captured, tried, and convicted. But the penalties were never
carried out?'
The law of prize may now be found in the United States Code
under the general heading, "Armed Forces," and under the more
particular sub-heading of "Navy and Marine Corps." Two brief
excerpts will be illustrative of the law of prize and particularly of the
two main actions of recapture of goods owned by United States
nationals and the seizure of property of citizens of another country.
This chapter applies to all captures of vessels as prize during war by
authority of the United States or adopted and ratified by the President.
However, this chapter does not affect the right of the Army of the Air Force,
while engaged in hostilities, to capture [enemy ships] wherever found and without
prize procedure ....
(a) If a vessel or other property that has been captured by a force hostile to
the United States is recaptured, and the court believes that the property had not

been condemned as prize by competent authority before its recapture, the court
shall award an appropriate sum as salvage.
(c)If the recaptured property belonged to any person residing within or
under the protection of the United States, the court shall restore the property to

its owner upon his claim and on payment of such sum as the court may award
as salvage, costs, and expenses0 2

To analogize the seizure at sea of the Bahia de Nipe with the
tacit approval of the United States (a conclusion to be drawn if the
court had held the ship for adjudication or if the United States had
not appeared in court and argued for the release of the ship from
30.

J. Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers, in

(1898).
31.

Id.

32.

10 U.S.C. §§ 7651 & 7672 (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction) to the capture of a prize and subsequent condemnation
may seem unusual, if not fanciful. But the result of the capture of a.
prize which had on board some cargo previously captured from a
United States national and the hoped-for result of the actions in
respect to the Bahia de Nipe and its cargo would have been the same.
In spite of some differences in nomenclature, both the physical and
legal proceedings by which that hoped-for result was to have been
obtained would have been surprisingly similar.
In both cases a ship of a foreign owner sailing under the
protection of a foreign sovereign whose flag the vessel flies is
forcefully seized on the high seas and diverted from its intended
course. In the law of prize this is called "capture." The result is the
same as "hijacking." This is the first step. The second step in each
case is to bring the ship into a friendly jurisdiction and submit the
title of ship and cargo to a court for determination. The Bahia de
Nipe had on board goods "stolen" from a United States national.
The federal court of the United States said that if jurisdiction had
been continued it would have restored these goods to their owner.
That cargo had not been seized at sea by a hostile "capture" but had
been seized on land by a "confiscation" contrary to international law.
The effect of "capture" with subsequent "condemnation" and the
effect of "confiscation" by a fully executed act of state have the same
result; the original owner in each case has been deprived of his goods
and the title in them in accordance with the law of the country of the
captor or the confiscator.
If the goods on board had not been "condemned" as prize, they
remained the property of the original owner. The Hickenlooper
Amendment (not in effect at the time of the Bahia de Nipe case)

directs the courts to recognize that no change of title is effected by a
confiscation contrary to international law. The Hickenlooper
Amendment, therefore, if applied to the law of prize, merely changed
the results of a "capture" and "condemnation" as a "reprisal"
(compensation for losses suffered) to a "recapture" of "stolen
goods," since the title remained the same regardless of the
"confiscation." On arrival of the Bahia de Nipe within United States
territory, the ship was libeled, and the libelants wanted a judgment
which would only be paid by the sale of the ship (transfer of title) and
the division of the proceeds. Thus the result of a capture of a prize
which had on board property of a United States national and the
hijacking of the Bahia de Nipe (if the court had retained jurisdiction
and had found the claims against it and the cargo valid) would have
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been the same; the owner in both cases would be deprived of his ship
under the judgment of an alien court and the "stolen" goods on
board would have been returned to their owner.
The Executive Department of our Government, however, urged
the Court not to let this happen, but to decline jurisdiction and return
the ship to the Republic of Cuba. Reciprocity is a cardinal principle
in international relations. Whatever Cuba may have done in the
past-actions universally and heartily condemned within the United
States-all airplanes hijacked and flown to Cuba have been returned.
Furthermore, there is ample authority that the act of violence, or
stealth in lieu of violence, by the captain and ten crew members on
the high seas, if authorized or ratified by the United States, would be
considered an international delinquency.
First, the United States Government has never permitted a private
citizen, in time of peace, to seize by force on the high seas property,
even if wrongfully in possession of another, in order that this property
might rightfully be returned to the owner. Such capture has been
authorized only in time of war. :3
-Second, such action would probably violate the maxim not "to
vex the peace of nations." A large portion or the exportable property
in Cuba's possession following the confiscation decrees had been
owned by nationals of the United States. An official condonation of
the hijacking of the Bahia de Nipe would encourage others to seek
methods of taking from the possession of Cuba other property, which
under United States law is considered to still be owned by United
States nationals, and to attempt to return it to the United States.
Furthermore, the effect of transfer of title by confiscation is
recognized as valid under both United States and Cuban law as to
property of Cuban corporations owned by Cuban nationals, none of'
whom can invoke international law as to acts or their own government.
A ratification of the seizure procedure would become an international
wrongfuJ_ act. Also, since Cuban law recognized the validity of the confiscation of the cargo any efforts by private citizens to reach such property on a vessel owned by the sovereign state of Cuba, would undoubtedly have caused Cuba to use counter force or to institute "reprisal," and
thus certainly "vex the peace of nations." Finally, it must be noted that
33. "'Inthe consideration of that question we assume that 'capture' and 'prize' are not
convertible . ...
Ordinarily the property must be brought in for adjudication as the question is one of title
which does not vest until condemnation .....
The Manila Prize Cases, 188 U.S. 254, 259-60
(1903).
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Cuba is still a "friendly" country in the sense that its government is
recognized by the United States as the de jure Government of Cuba.-4
Clearly, therefore, even indirect authorization by the United States to
hijack Cuban ships and bring their cargo to the United States would
encourage a foreigner to act against his own government and its laws.
Third, it is unclear that the United States could authorize a
foreigner, in time of peace or war, to serve as an agent in the seizure
of a foreign ship. An incident during World War II is illustrative
of the problem. A Dutch ship was transporting a cargo of coal to
Japan when the wireless reported that the Netherlands had declared
war on Japan. The Dutch master then returned the ship to a United
States port, where the Chinese crew sought a declaration that the
ship's cargo was prize and that they could be paid out of the proceeds
of the sale of the coal. A United States Court rejected this plea,
stating:
There is no proof in this case that any government, either Dutch, Chinese or
American, has authorized or ratified any capture of this cargo as a prize of War.
In the absence of statute I see no legal basis for American authorization
or
5
ratification of such capture by Chinese or non-American captors

Fourth, ratification of such seizures might be unwise in light of
the dictum of the Court of Aden concerning the status of hijacking in
the famous case of The Rose Mary (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v.
Jaffrate).11The Rose Mary, loaded with oil purchased from the Iranian
Government which had confiscated the oil properties of the AngloIranian Oil Company, was on a voyage to Bari, Italy. During the
voyage, the ship's Master received conflicting orders from the charterer
and owner-one to continue his voyage and another to put in at the port
of Aden, then a protectorate of Great Britain. Off the coast of Aden, the
ship was met by a tug with a representative of the ship's owner aboard
who demanded that the captain disobey his orders to continue to Italy
and, contrary to the interest of the purchaser of the oil, to enter the port
of Aden. An airplane of the Government of Aden circled the ship, and
the captain put into Aden where the oil was immediately claimed by
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The captain of the ship protested the
jurisdiction of the court in which the claim by the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company had been made. The captain stated that the court had no
34. Jan. 7, 1959, recognition by the United States. 40 DEP'T STATE BuL 128 (1959).
This recognition has not been withdrawn although our diplomatic representatives have been
called home. Diplomatic contact is carried on for the United States by a Foreign government
still maintaining an embassy in Cuba.
35. Ling v. 1,689 Tons of Coal, 78 F. Supp. 57, 62 (W.D. Wash. 1942).
36. Sup. Ct., Aden, Jan. 9, 1953, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246, [1953] INT'i. L. REP. 316.
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power to take possession of the ship and cargo on the ground that he
had been forced to enter Aden. He considered himself "hijacked" and
feared he would be bombed if he did not comply with the demand to
enter Aden. But the Aden judge rejected his plea and assumed
jurisdiction over the Rose Mary and its cargo:
As to his fear of the aeroplane, it seems to me very unlikely that this really
existed. No reasonable man could think it likely that Her Majesty's Government
in the year 1952 would try to resolve a commercial dispute by what would be
little short of an act of warY

The judge also held that the title to the oil had not been transferred
by the confiscatory acts of Iran, since those acts were contrary to
international law. No answer was ever given to the obvious questions
of who wanted the ship to enter Aden, and why s
Fifth, international self-help was disapproved by the United
States Supreme Court in Sabbatino. For example, there were elements
of self-help which the Court condemned in that case:
Although that rule [against an enforcement of foreign penal and revenue laws]
presumes invalidity in-the forum whereas the act of state principle presumes the
contrary, the doctrines have a common rationale, a rationale that negates the
wisdom of discarding the act of state rule when the plaintiff is a state which is
not seeking enforcement of a public act.
Certainly the distinction proposed would sanction self-help remedies, something
hardly conducive to a peaceful international orderY

Indeed, hijacking a foreign ship on the high seas seems a very great
manifestation of international self-help, more than suggested by the
factual situation in the Sabbatino case.
Our conclusion must be, therefore, that the "suggestion" of the
executive branch of our government that the court relinquish its
jurisdiction over the Bahia de Nipe and the court's acquiescence
prevented the United States from committing a provocative act little
short of an act of war against Cuba.
Beyond all of these technical considerations of jurisdiction, it
should be remembered that judicial abstention, too, is a judicial
37.

[1953] INT'L L. REP. 316, 319-20.

38. In a later English case, the judges indicated that the Aden judge misinterpreted the
cases on which he relied. In Re Helbert Wagg & Co., (1956) Ch. 323, [1956] I W.L.R. 183. The
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company challenged other oil shipments which reached Italy and Japan, but
in these cases its efforts to secure a judgment that it had title to the oil were unsuccessful. See
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., Civ. Ct. Rome, Sept. 13, 1954, [1955] II Foro
Italiano I. 256, [1955] INT'L L. REP. 23 (It.); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Indemitsu Kosan
Kabuski Kaisha, Dist. Ct., Tokyo, [1953] INT'L L. REP. 305, affd, High Ct., Tokyo, [1953]
INT'L L. REP. 312 (Japan).
39. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 437-38 (1964).
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function. Cogent reasons may exist why a court should not attempt to
decide the legal rights of the parties before it, or the disposition of a
res, although legally entitled to do so. A hundred and fifty years ago,
a United States Government attorney argued successfully before the
Supreme Court of the United States that the Court should decline
jurisdiction and not adjudicate the private claims made against a ship
claimed by a foreign sovereign:
It is beautiful in theory, to exclaim "fiat justitia, ruat coelum," [let justice be
done, though the heavens fall] but justice is to be administered with a due regard
for the law of nations, and to the rights of other sovereigns.0

If we consider national jurisdiction as broad as national power, it
is clear that the courts of the United States had jurisdiction over the
Bahia de Nipe and its cargo. But the question of the propriety of
exercising jurisdiction cannot be disposed of simply by reference to
geographical position of a res. If history teaches us anything, it is that
nations /nay not use unlimited power over persons and things within
their national jurisdiction and remain at peace with their neighbors.
In these tempestuous times, no wise nation would exercise power
without recognition of the self-imposed limitations on such use by the
nation's position in the world and by presently existing international
relations.
40.

The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 123 (1812).

